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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of
the FY89 unit costs at a consolidated supply depot. The
research focused primarily on the allocation schemes used for
allocating general and administrative (G&A) and indirect costs
at three sites of the newly consolidated supply depot known as
the Defense Distribution Region West (DDRW) headquartered in
Tracy, California. This is the prototype consolidated supply
depot outlined in the Defense Management Review Decision
(DMPD) Number 902. The three sites researched are the former
Defense Depot, Tracy, California, former Sharpe Army Depot,
Lathrop, California and the physical distribution department
at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California. An overview
of the Department of Defense's new unit cost resourcing
system, including the terminology, concepts and formats of the
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The purpose of this thesis research project is to examine
how unit costs are defined and measured for the physical
distribution functions at three supply depots in the newly
consolidated Defense Distribution Region West (DDRW). The DDRW
consists of the former Defense Depot, Tracy and Sharpe Army
Depot and the physical distribution department of Naval Supply
Center, Oakland.
Differences in unit cost assumptions, allocation schemes
and unique missions at each of these activities will be
investigated and analyzed. The intent of this research is to
provide a management tool for the DDRW commander to use as a
basis for comparison of unit costs at the various sites and
for overall performance evaluation.
B. DECLINING ESOURCES
There are two realities concerning U.S. defense spending
in the 1980's. The first reality is that during this period
our government spent three trillion dollars on defense, the
largest amount (in terms of real dollars) ever spent by a
western government. The second reality is that since 1985
defense spending has been reduced at the average of 3% per
year. During the first half of the 1980's, dollars for defense
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spending were plentiful and defense managers concerned
themselves with acquiring new weapon systems with little
thought being given to the idea that someday the "well" would
run dry.
Increased expenditures during the 1980's were not unique
to the defense department as other federal departments and
agencies also shared in these increased expenditures. This
increased spending coupled with revenues increasing at a
lesser rate during the Reagan years brought about an increase
in the budget deficit each year. In 1985 the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH) Act set target goals for reducing the annual
budget deficit. Reducing the deficit without increased taxes
can only be accomplished through reduced government spending.
Thus, the GRH Act signaled the fact that defense expenditures
would be reduced in the future. In fact, with the exception of
reducing Defense Spending, the GRH Act has been perceived as
unsuccessful. The reduction of defense expenditures started
under the Reagan administration and has continued under the
Bush administration.
C. DIMINISHED SOVIET THREAT
Though the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act may be perceived as
the catalyst for declining defense expenditures the reduced
threat from the Soviet block during the late 1980's added
serious momentum to the cry for reducing our defense
forces/structure and the accompanying expenditures. To many
2
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Americans, Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika in the
mid-1980's was the first sign that the Cold War was thawing.
But it was the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, the
recent unification of Germany and the pending removal of
Soviet troops from Eastern Europe which has convinced most
Americans that the cold war is over and has caused great
debate over the spending of the "peace dividend" made
available from reduced defense expenditures. Except now the
Iraq invasion of Kuwait has created uncertainty as to the
future of defense expenditures.
D. DECISIONS FOR THE 1990's
In light of everything mentioned above, top defense
officials were convinced in the late 1980's that defense
spending would be reduced during the 1990's. In general, there
are three possile ways to accomplish a reduction in defense
expenditures.
The first way is to take a vertical cut. A vertical cut is
the complete removal of a weapon system from the defense
inventory. An example would be the mothballing of the navy's
four battleships.
Taking a horizontal cut is the second way to reduce
expenditures. A horizontal cut is the partial funding or
partial removal of a weapon system. Examples would be the navy
A funding maintenance or overhauls at 50% of previous years'
expenditures, the army reducing the frequency for overhauls of
3
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tanks or the air force cutting by half the number of fighter
squadrons in its inventory.
The third way to reduce defense expenditures is to make
efficiency or productivity gains. Gains are accomplished by
military services or units accomplishing the same taskings
with reduced funding. This can only be done through a service
or unit changing the processes by which it accomplishes its
mission, i.e. eliminating waste or inefficiencies. An example
of an efficiency gain would be the cost savings involved by
consolidating each of the military services pay activities
into one site or location.
Z. FOCUS OF THZSIS RES3ARCH
Our thesis project will focus on investigating the third
approach, namely an initiative to accomplish efficiency and/or
productivity gains through consolidation and better cost
planning and control. Though the innovative DOD concept of
unit cost resourcing in itself will not generate gains or
"cost savings", resourcing or budgeting by unit costs will
motivate managers to analyze the processes by which he or sha
accomplishes their mission and improve efficiency and mission
effectiveness.
Concerning unit costs, there are numerous cost issues
which one could investigate or study. Although the idea of
unit costs is relatively new to DOD (there are exceptions),
the private sector has used concepts of unit costs for
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decades. Any managerial or cost accounting text discusses in
some length unit costs. For Defense contractors, the Cost
Accounting Standards Board (CASB) provides guidance for
contract costs. Unit costs include direct, indirect, and
general and administrative (G&A) costs. For this research
project we examine the indirect costs and G&A overhead
allocation portion of the unit cost equation. To accomplish
this we will investigate how total costs are derived,
allocated, and calculated at three DOD supply depots, and what
unique costs exist at each site.
The idea of using unit costs in DOD is a new, emerging
area and many DOD managers have no experience with unit costs.
Historical information on unit cost is extremely limited.
Therefore, unit cost in the DOD arena is difficult to study
using an analytical framework or model. Also the use of
questionnaires to gather information is not possible because
so little is known of the unit cost concept that formulating
questions is premature. Field research was the only viable
research technique available to gather information for this
project.
F. PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS
The remaining thesis chapters will discuss as follows:
1. Chapter II. Background and History
To provide the reader with necessary perspective in
this chapter we provide a discussion of unit costing in DOD
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and background/history of each of the three sites, Tracy,
Sharpe and Oakland, and their parent commands. We will also
explain origins of the unit costing concept in DOD and the
role of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and the services
in providing unit cost information. We attempt to answer the
who, what, when and where in this chapter.
2. Chapter III. Nethodology,Terminology,Concepts and
Formats.
This chapter presents the research methods and
-hniques that we used to perform our field work and why we
chose those methods. Our research questions, as well as a
statement of our hypothesis, will also be included.
3. Chapter IV. Analysis of Research Data
This chapter contains the data gathered during the
research and analyses of the various research questions.
4. Chapter V. Summary
This chapter will provide our conclusions and
recommendations and, also, questions for future research.
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I1. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
This chapter provides background information on DOD's
consolidation of the services supply depots, DOD's
Comptroller's design of unit costs, and on the three site
locations which we concentrated our research.
A. MILITARY LOGISTICS PRIOR TO 1989
The suggestion that the logistics branches of the military
services are inefficient compared to private industry has a
long history. Shortly after the end of World War II, former
President Herbert Hoover chaired a presidential commission
which recommended centralizing management of common military
logistics support. In October 1961, the Defense Supply Agency
(DSA) was established. The DSA was chartered to provide common
supply and service support to the military services while
remaining independent of the services. Congress, at that time,
was concerned with the duplication of effort and waste
associated with separate supply systems managing supplies
commonly used by two or more services.
In July 1970 the Blue Ribbon Panel Report to the President
and Secretary of Defense said:
It is clear that significant military improvement can be
achieved through the efficient, coordinated exploitation
of new technologies in the areas of transportation,
7
communications, automatic data processing (ADP), and
integrated procurement.
In 1976 DSA was renamed the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
to reflect its broadened role in the military logistics
system.
In 1982 the Wholesale Interservice Depot Support Study
(WIDS) prepared by the Logistics Systems Analysis Office said:
We examined the wholesale distribution system as an
entity, identifying the relationships between material
managers, depots and customers and the resulting
distribution patterns. We observed a system which can only
be characterized as sub-optimum. It is not a single system
but five semi-autonomous systems which are loosely
connected by very broad DOD policy guidance. Although each
component has attempted to optimize its own system, there
has not been a coordinated effort to optimize the DOD
System as an entity.
The study also described how the typical customer receives
material from 18 different depots, some located within 10
miles of each other, because the supply systems fail to act in
unison.
B. DZFZNSE h RZVIEW IN 1989
Today, a similar attitude persists and a new
"consolidation" effort has taken place. During early 1989 the
Defense Department, under the strain of reduced funding due to
the federal budget deficit, initiated the Defense Management
Report Consolidation Studies as a vehicle for identifying
potential areas where cost savings could be achieved.
Specifically, the Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD)
902, issued November 11, 1989, addresses the consolidation of
8
Defense Supply Depots. The goal being that such a
consolidation would result in significant savings in a variety
of areas: base and headquarters overhead costs, systems
development costs, transportation costs, inventory costs,
personnel costs (both military and civilian), etc.
C. CONSOLIDATED DEPOT: A PROTOTYPE
The San Francisco Bay Area was selected as the prototype
for implementation of DMRD 902 with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Donald J. Atwood approving the decision in April 1990.
This area includes the physical distribution function at
Defense Depot Tracy, California (DDTC), Sharpe Army Depot,
Lathrop, California (SHAD) Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento,
California (SAAD), Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan
Air Force Base, Sacramento, California (SMALC), and Naval
Supply Center Oakland, Oakland, California (NSCO). This
consolidated activity is known as the Defense Distribution
Region West (DDRW) and is under the organizational control of
DLA. All of these physical distribution functions have either
moved or will move under the contro) of DDRW. The entire
Sharpe site, SHAD, moved under DDRW command in June 1990. Only
the physical distribution department of NSCO was placed under
DDRW in June 1990. This department is now referred to as the
Oakland Distribution Site (ODS) or DDRW-ODS. The other
departments of NSCO remained under the organizational control
of the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command. The three
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sites at Oakland, Tracy and Sharpe will serve as the focus of
our research project. The SAAD and SMALC sites are currently
scheduled to transfer under DDRW command in January and July
1991, respectively.
D. TOTAL COST PZR UNIT O OUTPUT
The idea of using unit costs or "unit costing" for
Department of Defense (DOD) activities was initiated by the
Principal Deputy Comptroller of DOD Donald B. Shycoff in
August 1989. In April 1990 Mr. Shycoff advised all of the
military services and defense agencies that a DOD-wide cost
per unit of output resourcing system would be developed for a
number of functional areas to enhance visibility of costs and
contribute to better management of resources.
In April 1990, Mr. Shycoff issued a memorandum to the
Assistant Secretaries of the military services for financial
management and the DLA comptroller outlining the primary total








7. Depot Maintenance, and
8. Commissaries.
Historically, DOD commands have used some form of bottom
line budgeting when allocating resources to supply depots. The
primary goal for implementing unit costing resourcing is to
influence DOD managers and workers to reduce the cost of doing
business. Top DOD personnel believe that unit costs provide
maximum visibility and flexibility in making tradeoff
decisions between cost elements. There are five ways in which





4. Support budgets, and
5. Make decisions.
E. ILLUSTRATION OF UNIT COSTS
To illustrate how unit costs will figure in the budgeting
and resourcing process for DOD the following example is
provided.
In the upcoming fiscal year (FY) it is predicted that the
Monterey Supply Depot' will be asked to perform a workload of
'A hypothetical command.
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1,000 units. During the current fiscal year (EY0) the supply
depot performed a workload of 500 units at a total cost of
$500. Therefore the unit cost for FYO is $1 per unit. Based on
this unit cost, Monterey Supply Depot will be budgeted $1,000
for FY1. This $1,000 is obtained by multiplying the expected
workload (1,000 units) by the unit cost ($1.00 per unit).
Using the DOD concept of resourcing and budgeting based on
unit cost, an activity will only be funded for workload
actually performed. In this example, if only 750 units are
actually performed then they would only be allowed to spend
funds up to $750 (750 units x $1 per unit). If on the other
hand Monterey Supply Depot was tasked with performing a
workload of 1200 units they would be allowed $1,200 which is
in excess of the original budgeted amount.
The above example illustrates that budgeting is
accomplished using predicted workload but resourcing or
funding is based on actual workload. In each the base year
cost is used to derive the dollar amounts. Note that funding
is based on past unit costs and not on actual current unit
costs. In the above example, if Monterey Supply Depot spends
$1.25 per unit to perform a workload of 1,000 units (total
cost of $1,250), they would still be funded at a rate of $1
per unit or $1,000.
Department of Defense officials feel that resourcing at
the past unit rate and for actual units of work performed will
cause managers to control or evaluate more carefully the
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events that drive the cost of their activity. This approach to
DOD resourcing closely resembles recent emphasis on activity
based costs and cost drivers in the private sector and is
completely different from the bottom line budgeting which has
been prevalent in DOD. Bottom line budgeting allowed managers
a fixed amount of resources to use during the period
regardless of workload. If the workload did not materialize
(along with the associated costs) then managers were not
required to scrutinize cost and cost drivers. When resourced
via the bottom line budgeting process, managers only worried
if workload exceeded predicted amounts since costs rquired to
complete the additional workload had not been budgeted for.
F. UNIT COST LITERATURE
A quick review of cost accounting books coverage of unit
costs is warran d.2 The general agreement is that unit costs
are: a total cost divided by some related measure of activity
or output such as manhours used, machine hours or units
produced. Total costs are comprised of fixed costs and
variable costs.
Indirect costs are merely those costs which have no direct
observable relationship to output. Some components of fixed
costs may vary from period to period but do not vary in direct
2Several of the Cost Accounting textbooks reviewed are:
Deakin and Maher (1987), Fischer and Frank (1985) and Horngren
(1972).
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relationship to changes in activity or output measures in the
short run. Sorc Fixed costs are controllable by the manager
(repairs and maintenance) and some are not (depreciation).
Fixed costs which may be changed by management decision in the
short term (1 year or less) are sometimes referred to as
discretionary fixed costs while those costs which are not
currently controllable are referred to as nondiscretionary or
committed fixed costs. In the long run though all fixed costs
may change.
Variable costs are those costs which vary in direct
proportion with the increase or decrease of output. An example
of a variable cost is the labor required to paint a building.
If p;inters receive $7 per hour for their labor, two hours of
painting will cost $14. Thus, total labor cost will vary in
direct proportion to the number of labor hours.
One of t. most common mistakes when analyzing unit costs
is to regard all of the unit cost as variable. Changes in
output or activity (the denominator in the unit cost equation)
will affect total variable costs but not total fixed costs.
Total fixed costs remain constant in the short term. Due to
the fact that the existing accounting systems are unable to
identify and support fixed costs, as stated in the DOD Unit
Cost Resourcing Guide, current DOD policy is that unit costs
assume that total costs are variable costs. This guide also
states that until such time as variable and fixed costs are
distinctly definable and supportable, all costs will be
14
treated as variable. This implies that DOD will develop models
to identify fixed and variable costs in the future.
G. BACKGROUND ON RESZARCH SITES
In the remainder of this chapter we will focus on
providing background on the specific sites under study (Tracy,
Sharpe, Oakland) and provide a detailed outline of their past
and present organizational (command) structure, resourcing
techniques, customer base, inventory composition and unique
supply missions. Each of the sites will be addressed
separately. These three sites were chosen for study because of
(1) their proximity to the Naval Postgraduate School, (2)
limited time to execute research, (3) financial constraint in
travel funds and (4) these three sites have already been
consolidated.
TABLE .
FY 89 SITE DATA
Gross square Inventory Operating
feet of storage Personnel Value Budget
Tracy 4.9 million 1,700 $1.2B $72M
Sharpe 3.8 million 1,200 $1.3B $63M
Oakland3  7.1 million 700 $4.2B $72M




The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM), as the
logistics arm of the United States Navy, consists of the
following:
1. Headquarters staff
2. Two Inventory Control Points (ICPs)
3. Eight Naval Supply Centers (NSCs)
4. Four Navy Regional Contracting Centers (NRCCs)
5. One Central Design Agency (CDA)
6. Navy Resale System
7. Navy Publications and printing service
8. Other field activities in support of specific aspects of
the NAVSUP mission.
NAVSUPSYSCOM's mission is to provide material support
(acquisition and fleet support) needs of the Navy for supplies
and supporting services by developing and promulgating Navy
policies and methods for the supply, safeguarding,
distribution and disposal of naval materials; providing
assigned supplies and services, including the resale services,
to naval units and other authorized customers; managing
subordinate activities; providing technical guidance and
direction to naval activities concerning execution of supply
policies and methods; and coordinating Navy requirements with
the Defense Supply system.
16
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The Naval Supply Center (NSC) in Oakland, California is
one of the eight NAVSUP NSCs. Of the eight NSCs, Oakland ranks
first in gross square footage of storage; second in line items
carried and net square footage of storage; and third in
inventory value, average monthly issues and average monthly
receipts. The NSC at Oakland was established in December,
1941. It is the principal distribution point for supply
support of fleet operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans.
Three different sites make up NSCO; (1) the 541 acre main site
at Oakland, (2) the Point Molate Fuel Facility located at the
Port of Richmond (California), and (3) the Alameda
Annex/Facility and Aviation Supply Department in Alameda,
California. The main site plays host to approximately 30
tenant activities and is the homeport for three USN ships and
28 Military Sealift Command (MSC) Pac.ific ships. During World
War II, at the height of its activity, the supply Depot, as it
was then known, employed 16,000 naval and civilian personnel.
Today there are 58 military and just over 1700 civilian
personnel with an annual payroll of $45.9 million. The recent
consolidation, in June, 1990, shifted approximately 700
civilian and 11 military personnel in the physical
distribution function from NSCO to DLA organizational control.
I. SPECIFIC SITE-TRACY
Tracy is the westernmost depot in the DLA distribution
system. It was established in January 1963 and is situated on
17
448 acres of government owned land. There are 4.5 million
gross square feet of covered space, 62,000 gross square feet
of refrigerated space and 2.4 million gross square feet of
open improved storage area at Tracy. This particular site is
ideally located near the hub of all major types of
transportation:
1. Aircraft facilities at Travis Air Force Base, 65 miles to
the northeast and at least three major metropolitan or
international airports within a 100 mile radius.
2. Rail transportation is available from two major
railroads, Southern Pacific and Union Pacific, with 18 miles
of internal rail track on the site itself. The Santa Fe rail
line is 20 miles north in Stockton.
3. Deep water facilities are located at the Port of
Stockton, 20 miles north, and the Port of Oakland is located
60 miles west.
4. Several major interstates, 5, 580 and 205 serve the Tracy
area and California State Route 99 is also nearby.
The supported customer base consists of all the military
services (ArmyNavy,Marines and Air Force) and other specified
federal agencies located in California and the southwestern
United States and Pacific overseas areas. In addition to
general military supplies, Tracy also provides direct support
of semi-perishable food to selected Army and Air Force
overseas commissaries, military bases on the west coast, naval
stations in the pacific region and ships of the Pacific Fleet
stationed in the Oakland-San Francisco Bay area. The ships are
reprovisioned from a 300,000 square foot warehouse located in
Alameda.
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The total 1989 annual operating budget for Tracy is
approximately $72 million, $47 million of which goes for
payroll. The work force consists of 1,700 civilians and 17
military personnel.
J. SPECIFIC SITA-SHARPEAMY DEPOT (SHAD)
The SHAD site is the former Sharpe Army Depot. Prior to
consolidation it was one of 18 depots under the U. S. Army
Depot System Command (DESCOM). There were 12 depots and 5
depot activities located in the United States and one in
Germany. Sharpe is one of three geographic area oriented
depots (AOD) and its supply responsibilities cover storage
and distribution operations for supplies destined for Alaska,
Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa, Japan, Korea and the eight westernmost
U. S. states. SHAD was officially established in 1942 as the
Lathrop Holding and Reconsignment Point. In 1948, a new name,
Sharpe General Depot was assumed.
Situated on 724 acres, the facility includes eight million
square feet of improved storage space with almost 2 million
covered and 3/4 million in controlled humidity warehousing. A
new state-of-the-art distribution facility was constructed in
1986. Future plans under consolidation call for optimal use of
this new Western Distribution Facility (WDF) with Sharpe and
Tracy serving as the primary hub for receiving, issuing and
storage.
19
Sharpe is located in Lathrop, California, seven miles
south of Stockton and 16 miles north of the Tracy site. The
watercraft section of Sharpe is located at Rough and Ready
Island which is adjacent to the Port of Stockton, the largest
inland deepwater seaport in California. This channel leads to
the Port of Oakland, one of the world's largest
containerization ports. Sharpe serves as the consolidation and
containerization point for shipments from other Army depots,
DLA, GSA and other sources to Army customers in Alaska,
Hawaii, Japan, Korea and the Pacific Basin region.
Travis Air Force Base is only 60 miles northwest of Sharpe
and can handle the largest military aircraft for air
shipments. In addition, the Stockton Metropolitan Airport is
only 3 miles north and can accommodate the largest military
and commercial cargo aircraft.
The 1989 annual operating budget exceeded $63 million and
the employee payroll topped $32 million. The work force
consists of 1,200 civilians and 32 military personnel and
approximately 100 contract workers.
Sharpe was funded under the Army Indurstrial Fund (AIF).
The AIF is a revolving fund. Industrial Funds are working
capital funds which are used to finance work that will be paid
for by the customer after the work has been completed.' The
4Practical Comptrollership Course Guide, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 1990,
p. H-3.
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Department of Defense considers Industrial Fund accounting as
a management tool to assist in controlling the costs of goods
and services in profit centers where the objective is to
breakeven. All of Sharpe's customer support missions were
funded by the customer using Operations and Maintenance, Army
(O&M,A) funds which then reimbursed the AIF services provided.
The recent transition to DLA will now have the customer paying
with O&M,A but reimbursing the Defense Stock Fund. In the AIF
funding arena, a two week capital turnover system is employed.
This means, for example, that a two week allotment of money is
provided up front from the AIF and bills to the customer for
the exact amount of services provided must be generated by the
end of the two weeks. Under the Army, lines of work for the
entire year were provided to DESCOM by individual commands
(customers) and DESCOM advised the depots as to what workload
to anticipate for the fiscal year. Unplanned requirements
could be submitted throughout the year. The important concept
here is that customers are paying for service (i.e.,
accessorize a barge, set up a field kitchen) and not for the
material.
K. FUTUR CONSOLIDATION SITES
The current consolidation plan calls for Sacramento Army
Depot (SAAD) to move under DDRW command in January, 1991 and
Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SMALC) in July, 1991. These
two activities, like the Oakland site will retain
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responsibility for consumer stocks, local purchase support for
local units and customer service functions. A detailed profile
has not been provided due to limited time and financial
resources. However, the analysis provided by the research at
the other three sites will be sufficient to serve as a
baseline for comparison and further studies.
In this chapter we provided a background of the various
efforts which have been undertaken to improve the efficiency
of DOD supply activities, including the most recent
recommendations made in the Defense Management Review. We then
discussed the concept of unit costs and closed with background
and history of the three sites researched.
Next in Chapter III, we will present the methodology of
our research effort and the terminology, concepts and report .
formats used in DOD's unit cost resourcing system.
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III. METHODOLOGY,TERMINOLOGY, CONCEPTS AND FORMATS
In this chapter we will present the terms and concepts
underlying unit cost, the methods by which we collected the
unit cost data for our study and assumptions that were made to
expedite the research. Additionally, we will provide the
terms, definitions and concepts associated with DOD's unit
cost system and a brief explanation of the format of the unit
cost reports. According to DOD guidelines, once implemented,
unit cost data will be used by DOD managers to:
1. Reduce the cost of doing business,
2. Improve operations,
3. Measure improvements,
4. Evaluate and support budgets, and
5. Make decisions.
A. RESEARCH METHODS USED
Our primary research questions address how costs are
defined, measured and allocated at Tracy, Sharpe and Oakland
and what unique cost assumptions, allocations and missions
exist at each site.
Due to an evolving field of change and policies and
because there is limited historical data we could not use
questionnaires or perform in-depth statistical analysis. Our
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research was conducted during an evolutionary process
(implementation of unit costing and consolidation) and
therefore field research was our best means of gathering data.
We supplemented our field research with (1) library
research to provide us with background on similar private
sector initiatives in unit costing, (2) a review of DOD
guidelines, memoranda, and drafts of documents pertinent to
unit costs, (3) personal interviews conducted with key
personnel involved in unit costing, and (4) a review of
initial and follow-on unit cost reports generated by the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for the Tracy, Sharpe and
Oakland sites as well as interviews with key DMDC personnel.
B. SITES CHOSEN
Although there were five sites identified for the
prototype consolidation at DDRW, we chose only three sites for
research because of time and financial limitations. The three
sites chosen were the closest to the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, the base from which the research
project was conducted. Additionally, as previously mentioned,
due to the new subject area no past data are available for
statistical or trend analysis and no knowledge or expertise
exists. We judge these three research sites to be
representative of the broad unit cost issues at other depots.
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C. DOD GUIDELINES
The DOD guidelines we reviewed provided us with initial
insight into DOD's approach to unit costing. Joint Service,
Defense Agency and OSD task forces were charged with
identifying organizational outputs, determining what data was
required to unit cost and how to capture the required data
from existing individual accounting systems.
D. ROLE OF THE DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey,
California was tasked by OSD to develop the unit cost report
system. This activity is a management information support
group to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel). It is chartered to provide
a facility within DOD for the collection and analysis of
manpower data extracted from files maintained by DOD
components and other Government agencies. There are
approximately 125 civilian data analysts and programmers
employed at DMDC and computer support for the databases is
provided by the W.R. Church Computer Center at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
The Department of Defense chose DMDC for the following
reasons:
1. DMDC is considered to have the unique ability to do this
type of work.
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2. DMDC is considered to have the most responsive ADP
facility.
3. The unit cost data will use manpower and base operations
data which DMDC already processes.
4. DMDC's capacity is unconstrained and the unit cost system
is a large project.
The unit cost report system entails extracting raw data
from the individual accounting systems and redisplaying this
data in a unit cost format. The format of the unit cost
reports will be discussed later in this chapter.
Each of the services and DLA submitted financial data to
DMDC to be used in generating the unit cost reports. Magnetic
tapes were used to transmit most of this information.
Financial data, manhours, cost codes and work units were
provided on a single tape from headquarters activities for
DLA, Army and Air Force supply depots. For these activities
financial information is forwarded to their respective
headquarters on a routine basis and it was easiest for the
headquarter activities to provide the financial information on
a single magnetic tape for all of their subordinate commands.
For the Navy, financial data, manhours and cost codes were
provided by the individual supply depots and the work unit
counts were provided by NAVSUP. Appendix A at the end of this
thesis illustrates the cost codes which are used by DLA
activities. A description of what is included in each of these
cost codes can be found in DLA Accounting and Finance Manual,
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DLAM 7000.1 Change 14. In addition, Appendices B and C5
illustrate the cost codes used by Navy and Army supply depots
respectively.
E. MEASURES OF OUTPUTS
The DOD handbook, "Unit Cost Resourcing Guide, INTERIM",
10/5/90 defines two types of outputs, primary and other.
Primary outputs are those outputs that reflect the primary
mission of an organization. These outputs are determined by
answering the question, "What is the main operation or service
the organization performs?". It is important to identify as
few primary outputs as possible to avoid fragmenting the
organization and defeating the purpose of managing total
costs. It is also important to maintain visibility of distinct
functions and, therefore, not aggregate or combine outputs
haphazardly. The primary output measure should represent the
most important mission of the organization. It will then
become the common denominator for planning and controlling
operations and .ission execution.
The primary outputs for Supply Depots, our research area,
have been identified as "line items received" and "line items
issued." This is consistent with the primary mission of supply
depots which is to receive, store and issue material. We did
not research the question of whether or not these are
5The source documents for appendices A,B and C were from
computer printouts provided by DMDC.
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appropriate measures of output. However, similar output
measures are used in private sector organizations involved in
comparable operations.
1. LINZ ITEMS RECEIVED:
A line item received refers to a single receipt of a
National Stock Number (NSN) on a receipt document to include
new procurement, redistributions, and customer returns. Each
receipt document can contain only one NSN. As an example, a
receipt of one box of ball point pens and the receipt document
for this one box of ball point pens counts as one receipt.
Also, a receipt of ten trailers of Xerox copier paper and a
single receipt document for all of the paper counts as one
receipt. The number of receipts credited to an activity
depends on the number of receipt documents and not on the
quantity on each document or on the dollar value of the
receipt. In this system, it doesn't matter if you receive one
box of pens valued at $3.00 or one submarine propeller valued
at $250,000 because all receipts are counted the same way.
2. LINE ITEMS ISSUED
A line item issued refers to a material release order
(MRO) and only one NSN item can be issued per MRO. Just as in
the case of receipts, the number of issues is determined by
the number of issue documents and not by the quantity on each
document or on the dollar value of the document.
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3. OTHER OUTPUTS
There are other tasks which are performed by an
activity which cannot be identified with the activity's
primary mission or primary outputs. A host activity providing
tenant services (utilities, office space, buildings, etc.) ;s
a good example of other outputs. These other outputs must be
identified to ensure that all costs associated with an
activity are being captured. Other outputs may be expressed in
cost-per-unit basis, on a reimbursable basis or up to a preset
ceiling. Other outputs may be resourced via the traditional
budgeting method (bottom line budgeting) or reimbursed on a
cost-per-unit basis if that data are available in the future.
Chapter IV will provide examples of the other outputs at
the three research sites.
Overall, the outputs, once identified, can now be related
to the functions performed by the individual activity.
Therein, lies the management tool, cost-per-output, that will
assist managers in identifying areas in need of improvement
and also provide a measure for improved efficiency.
Once all costs for a cost center have been identified cost
goals can be assigned. These cost goals reflect the operations
of that particular cost center and the costs that are within
its control. All of the costs of the cost centers can then be
rolled up into an entire activity goal.
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F. CATEGORIZS OF COST
The next area of importance in unit costs is determining
the categories of cost. The DOD handbook, just like a private
sector business, identifies three categories of costs. These
categories are direct, indirect, and general and
administrative costs.
1. DIRZCT COSTS
Direct costs are those costs clearly identified or
traced to a product or output and are carried 100% by the
function that produces output, such as hands-on labor or
material used in making or shipping the product. Direct
operating costs are incurred by first line entities solely to
benefit a specific output. Second line supervision, for
example, does not provide direct benefits to a specific output
so it is not considered a direct cost.
2. INDIRZCT COSTS
Indirect costs are those costs of a delrtment or
activity which cannot be identified or traced to i single
output or product. These costs are generally allo.ated rer a
select number of outputs, or allocated over all of the outputs
of an activity, depending on their individual nature. All
costs that benefit more than one output will be considered
indirect with the exception of those covered by general and
administrative costs (defined below). An example of an
indirect cost is second line supervision or the cost incurred
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with operating material handling equipment. The physical
inventory function or rewarehousing6 efforts would also be
examples of indirect costs.
3. GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
The final category of costs, general and
administrative (G&A) costs, are those costs that are
essentially considered overhead. That is, the management,
clerical and administrative costs of the operating segment.
These costs cannot be reasonably associated with any output or
even groups of outputs and are allocated over all of the
outputs or products. These types of costs generally include
local command and control personnel, comptroller, medical,
training, security, facilities engineering, legal services,
fire protection, custodial services, snow removal and other
similar activity support functions. For our research we
selected only the "indirect" costs and "G&A" costs for
examination as these costs must be allocated for unit cost
purposes. Direct costs are not examined here. Our assumption
is that these costs are accurately gathered and reported.
6Rewarehousing is a term used to describe the process of
moving material within an activity. Examples of why you would
rewarehouse are: (1) moving material to consolidate all of a
given item in one location or (2) moving a fast moving item to
a bin or carousel storage location to gain efficiency in the
receipt or issue process.
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G. OTHER TERMINOLOGY
The terms "overhead" and "indirect costs" are sometimes
used interchangeably in the DOD unit cost system and in
industry. Additionally, the term "allocated costs" is used to
describe the combination of indirect costs and G&A costs in
the DOD unit cost computation.
The output measures, "issues" and "receipts", may also be
referred to as work units or workload.In addition to issues
and receipts there are other missions or functions that an
activity may perform. These are referred to as "uniques".
Examples of uniques are the functions of procurement,
financial services and household goods shipment and receipt.
These functions may be a primary output of the activity but
are not related to the primary output measures of issues and
receipts.
The term "productive manhour" is used to distinguish those
hours an individual spends performing his or her basic task.
For example, an individual who works in the receiving area
normally works eight hours each day. Of these eight hours, the
individual may spend six "productive manhours" processing
receipts and two manhours receiving training. The individuals
time card will reflect the number of hours and the
corresponding cost codes7 of the various functions which they
performed on that day. The information on the time cards is
7As in Appendices A,B and C.
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used both to pay the individual and to generate financial
information. Examples of the type of financial information are
(1) productive manhours spent processing receipts, (2)
quantity of dollars spent on making issues and (3) number of
hours spent training personnel.
The sum of all productive manhours should be viewed as
"direct labor" similar to private industry for a division or
whole company. It is a measure of the efforts consumed by each
activity (i.e., issues,receipts,uniques).
H. COST DATA
Fiscal year8 1989 cost data were used because as of the
time of this research project all of fiscal year 1990 data had
not been submitted to DMDC for the three sites under research.
Additionally, DMDC had complete data for 1989, which is the
baseline selected by DOD for unit costing of supply depots.
I. UNIT COST REPORT FORMAT
What we refer to as the unit cost report is officially
known as the "Depot Cost, Manpower and Workload Analysis
Report". Despite this official title, everyone we had
discussions with at OSD, DMDC, and the three research sites
referred to the reports as "unit cost reports" and we will
'Fiscal years run from 01 October of one year until 30
September of the next year.
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continue to refer to the reports by the unofficial term of
"unit cost reports."
The generic unit cost report consists of two parts. Part
I is titled "Manhour Profile and G&A Allocation" while Part II
is titled "Costs and Workload." In this section we will
discuss what information is provided in both of these parts of
the unit cost report.
1. PART I. MANHOUR PROFILE AND G&A ALLOCATION
Paxt I of the report provides the distribution of the
allocated 9 costs of the activity to the primary outputs and
other outputs. In general, both G&A and indirect/overhead
costs are allocated based on productive manhours.
As an example we will once again use our hypothetical
command, the Monterey Supply Depot. During the year the
Monterey Supply Depot had $300 of G&A costs. Additionally they
spent 200 productive manhours processing receipts, 300
productive manhours making issues and 100 productive manhours
producing other outputs. The total productive manhours for the
year was 600. Based on the percentage of manhours used each
output would be allocated a share of the G&A costs. Receipts
would be allocated 33.3% or $100 of the G&A costs. 0
Likewise, issues and other outputs would be allocated 50%
gBoth G&A and Indirect/overhead costs.
"Receipts had 200 of the 600 total manhours.
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($150) and 16.7% ($50) of the G&A costs respectively. Under
this method all $300 G&A costs are allocated to some output.
Indirect/overhead costs for the Monterey Supply Depot
would be allocated under the same method except productive
manhours spent supervising workers would not be included in
the productive manhour totals. Since supervision is considered
an indirect/overhead cost which is allocated to outputs, the
productive manhours spent incurring these supervision and
other indirect costs are excluded from the base. To continue
our example, the Monterey Supply Depot had $200 of
indirect/overhead costs. Of the 200 productive manhours spent
processing receipts, 40 of the manhours were due to the
supervisors. Likewise, there were 50 manhours of supervision
in the issue function and 10 manhours spent supervising the
other outputs. After excluding the supervisors' manhours the
total manhours to be used to allocate indirect/overhead costs
is 500. Indirect/overhead costs would be allocated on the
following basis; $64 to receipts, $100 to issues and $36 to
other outputs.
The total allocated costs for the Monterey Supply Depot is
$500. Of the total allocated costs, receipts would have been
allocated $164, issues would have been allocated $250 and
other output $86.
This is a brief summary of the information which is
contained on Part I of the unit cost reports for supply
depots. The key item to remember is that G&A and
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indirect/overhead costs are allocated based on manhours.
Additionally, the manhour totals and the G&A and
indirect/overhead costs are provided to DMDC by magnetic tape
from the military services and DLA.
Table 2 provides a sample Part I unit cost report for our
hypothetical Monterey Supply Depot.
TABLE 2
PART I: MONTEREY SUPPLY DEPOT UNIT COST REPORT
G&A Ind/Ovhd G&A Ind/Ovhd TotalManhours V%) Manhours (%) Costs Costs Costs"
Receipts 200 (33.3) 160 (32.0) 100 64 164
Issues 300 (50.0) 250 (50.0) 150 100 250
Other12  i00 (16.7) 90 (18.0) 50 36 86
Total 600 (100) 500 (100) 300 200 500
2. PART 1I. COSTS AND WORKLOAD
Part II of the unit cost report provides the total
costs associated with outputs, the workload count of the
output (if there is an associated work measure) and the unit
cost for the output.




IThe total costs associated with an output include labor
(direct and indirect), non-labor (direct and indirect) and the
allocated costs (G&A and indirect/overhead). The labor and
non-labor costs and workload counts are taken from the
financial records provided to DMDC from the respective
services and DLA. The total amounts of allocated costs are
those calculated on Part I of the unit cost report.
Table 3 provides a sample Part II unit cost report for
our hypothetical Monterey Supply Depot.
TABLE 3
PART Ii: MONTEREY SUPPLY DEPOT UNIT COST REPORT
Non Total
Labor labor Allocated13 Costs Workload
Receipts $500 $100 $164 $764 100
Unit Cost $5.00 $1.00 $1.64 $7.64
Issues $750 $250 $250 $1,250 500
Unit Cost $1.50 $.50 $.50 $2.50
Sub-Total $1,250 $350 $414 $2,014 600
Unit Cost $2.08 $.58 $.69 $3.35
Other $250 $75 $86 $407 N/A
Total $1,500 $425 $500 $2,421 N/A
From Part II of a unit cost report you can obtain the
unit cost for receipts, issues and the combination of both of
13From Part I of the unit cost report. See Table 2.
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these outputs. Unit costs are derived by dividing the cost by
the workload. Our example was simplified but the labor and
non-labor columns can include both direct and indirect non-
labor costs.
J. COST DRIVERS
Another important concept when dealing with unit costs is
that they provide visibility of cost drivers. Visibility of
cost drivers allows the manager to determine if the best
output measurement is being used. For example, the supply
depot might want to look at tonnage moved, both received and
issued, as the denominator in the cost equation. Once the
total costs have been captured various analyses can be
performed.
In summary, the unit cost system provides both visibility
and flexibility to managers. No savings can be directly
attributable to unit costing, but rather savings realized will
result from changing or eliminating processes. Our research
questions and methods attempt to outline the specifics of unit
costs at three individual locations while keeping in mind
their unique missions and areas of concern. Chapter IV will
expand on the research questions at each site. We will also
speculate on the effects of consolidation at these sites and
how unit costs might be effected.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH DATA
In this chapter we will analyze the allocated costs
portion of the unit cost equation at Tracy, Sharpe and
Oakland. Chapter III has described the general approach and
terminology used in unit costing within DOD.
A. COST ALLOCATION SCHEMES
When this thesis research project was started we believed
that each of the three sites under research would allocate G&A
and indirect costs differently. We believed this because
specific guidance was not provided by DOD as to how to
allocate indirect and G&A costs. Thus, each of the services
and DLA might choose different means of allocation. Also, the
services and DLA have a long history of using different
methods to solve essentially the same problem so we felt that
this would be another instance of a difference of methods.
Our research determined that both indirect and G&A costs
were allocated to output measures based on manhours.
Department of Defense officials gave each service and DLA the
opportunity to allocate these costs by any means they desired
but all concerned chose to allocate indirect and G&A costs
based on manhours. Allocation could have been based on a
variety of choices. Other examples of a basis by which
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allocated costs could have been allocated are by using labor
dollars or number of employees.
G&A costs are allocated by large companies such as
General Electric on basis of "sales" of divisions or profits
of divisions. On the other hand, the CASB forced defense
contractors to use "total cost input" or some other base than
sales for G&A expense allocations to defense contracts. 4
Each activity's accounting records were used to determine
how many "productive" manhours had been charged to each of the !
outputs and uniques for both the indirect and G&A costs. As an
example, in Figure 4-1 we see that for issues there were
818,677 productive manhours used in calculating the share of
G&A costs attributed to issues and 413,174 manhours used in
calculating the share of indirect costs (called overhead in
the report) attributed to issues. 5 The 18,677 manhour
figure is the total number of productive man.iours used to make
the 1,267,642 issues.16 This number includes both direct
labor manhours and indirect labor manhours traceable to
issues. Recall that indirect labor includes second line
supervision and other labor costs which benefit two or more
outputs but not all outputs. The difference between the
"This requirement can be found in CAS 410, Allocation of
Business Unit G&A Expenses to Final Cost Objectives.
"Figure 4-1 contains Part I, Manhour Profile and G&A
Allocation for Oakland for FY89.
"This number comes from Figure 4-2 which is the Part II,
Costs and Workload for Oakland for FY89.
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818,677 and 413,174 productive manhour amounts, infers that
there were 405,503 indirect manhours involved in making the
1,267,642 issues. Since these 405,503 manhours are indirect,
they were not included in the manhour totals used to allocate
indirect costs.
B. TREATMENT OF SUPERVISION MANHOURS
The reader will note that for all three research sites
this difference between manhours used in calculating G&A and
indirect costs is true for issues only. For receipts, the
manhours used to calculate G&A and indirect costs are the
same. At first glance it appears as if the receipt function
does not require second line supervision (indirect labor
costs) but that the issue function does require second line
supervision. This is not true. A conscious decision by DOD and
DMDC was made to allocate all of the second line supervision
to issues for two reasons. First, the present accounting
systems are not sophisticated enough to differentiate between
the time a second line supervisor spends with individuals
making an issue or receipt. Second, issues make up a majority
of the workload at each of these three sites and in fact at
most DOD physical distribution activities.17
17Issues are 75% of the workload at Oakland, 90% at Tracy
and 84% at Sharpe.
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'OTUER CONSOLIDATED FUINCTIONS-001
LOCAL, DELIVERY 2,612,465 0 ) 0 3.471,69S 6.084.160
TOT CONSOLID FUNCTS 12,965,021 0 (17 $10 0 22.384,472 37.992.902
INAVY FLEET&INDUST SUPPORT CTR-SF .
iIh !I1AL IN' A .. s.; , C 482.293 1 .LO
INVEITTORY MANAGEMENr 691.005 0 8 0 0 1,065.470 1.756.475
TECHICAL SERVICES 217.908 0 ' 0 0 321,527 539.435
OtrFITTIG 1.121 0 u 0 0 1.334 2.4E5
REPAIRABLE IMGT 1.516.472 0 0 22. &43 0 1.914,403 3.453 675
SERyHiAPI 77.922 0 0 0 0 65.639 143,561
TOTAL NAVY FLEET-SF 3.033,827 0 , 22 800 0 3,850.664 6.907.291
'NAVY ILEET6INUST SUPPORT CTR-O6'
BAZARDOS WASTE 11.966 0 31 544 0 12.589 56,099
SPECIAL NEAPONS 147.497 0 II 60 299 0 202.698 410.494
IOTA;, NAVY FLEET-06M 159.463 0 0 91.843 0 215.287 466.592
'OTHER MISSIONS'
W6A t-IMBURSABLE 2.480,513 0 u 0 0 347.135 2.827.648
NAVY STOCK FUND ACTO 18,998 0 1) 0 0 71.781 150.77-
FINANZIAL SERVICES 4.906.632 0 7 69. I81 0 5.399.128 10.326.140
RETR'J RF SCREENINO 0 0 1 ) 0 0 0
PFERS)NAL PROpETv 1.264.745 0 (I 19,6t, 0 1.237.846 2.$22.25?
OTH MISSION OPS 1.098,640 0 , 2 ,2,798 0 727,347 2,078.795
ROTUREIENT 2.61,049 0 ' l 1,70 0 2.648.570 5.587.189
REGIuNAL CONTRACTI NG 0 0 , 0 0 0 0
TENANT SUPPRT 0 0 u 0 3.155.628 3,155.628
TOTA, OTHER MISSIONS 12.690.576 0 k10 414 0 13.587.434 26.648.425
"TOTAL ALL" 28,848.888 0 , . 17 166 0 40.037.857 72.015.210
'REIMBURSEMENTS-INCLUDED ABOVE'
DISTRIBUTION 3,909.138 0 1( 8.331 0 1.387.288 5,804.767
NAVY FLEET-SF 1.370.724 0 ', -1 611 0 0 1.369.109
NAVY FLET-06H 11.966 0 ( "123l 0 0 72.297
G A A 0 0 0 0 2,480,513 2.480,513
OTHE . MISSIONS 1,056,678 0 141 .26 0 0 1.200,304
TOTAL REIMBURS 6.348.506 0 '110.671 0 3.867.800 10,926,979
FIOJRE 4-2
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Officials felt that it was not cost effective to
determine whether the second line supervision should be
allocated to issues or receipts. However, we feel that the
costs of second line supervision could have been allocated
based on the workload. For instance, at Oakland issues are 75%
of the workload. We could therefore assume that 75% of the
second line supervision should be allocated to issues. There
would have been no additional costs involved in allocating
second line supervision on this basis.
Subtracting indirect manhours from the issues will result
in an overstatement of indirect costs allocated to receipts
and an understatement of indirect costs allocated to issues.
Additionally, most other functions (uniques) are treated in
the same manner as receipts in regards to the allocation of
indirect costs. Since the allocated costs are overstated for
receipts and understated for issues, an individual may wish to
discuss the aggregate total of the unit costs for receipts and
issues and not discuss the unit cost of receipts or the unit
cost of issues. It may be more prudent to discuss the "unit
cost" at a particular activity and mean the unit cost of
producing one unit of output and not one receipt or one issue.
In recent discussions with DMDC personnel, we were
informed that beginning with fiscal year 1991 data, indirect
costs will be allocated to the area where the costs were
incurred. Data from time cards will be used to determine
whether a supervisor was involved in processing receipts or
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making issues. Individuals researching unit costs in the
future should be aware that there will be difference in the
treatment of indirect costs for pre-FY91 and post-FY90.
C. CLASSIFICATION OF G&A AND INDIRECT COSTS
One final remark concerning allocated costs is that
individual line items in the financial records at each of the
three sites researched did not match DMDC unit cost reports.
The allocated G&A and indirect amounts differed among the
reports but the sum of the these two costs did match DMDC
reports. This may be due to differences between what DOD/DMDC
and the services and DLA consider G&A and indirect costs.
Since the total of these two costs is not different it appears
as if all parties concerned agree on what is allocated or
total allocated costs. In conversations with DOD and DMDC
personnel we were informed that DOD is making a concentrated
effort to resolve the semantics involved with unit cost
terminology. Once the semantics have been worked out
reconciling DMDC Unit Cost Reports and local records will
become easier.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the unit cost
at each of the three sites under research.
D. OAKLAND UNIT COST
From Figure 4-2 we can see that Oakland's unit costs were
$21.03 per receipt, $18.23 per issue and $18.92 per unit of
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output. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the unit cost for
each of these measures of output along with the percentage of
each part of the unit cost to the total cost. Each of these




Total Costs Unit Cost Unit Cost
Receipts:
Labor $3,625,393 $8.66 41.17%
Non-labor 203,657 .49 2.31
Allocated 4,976,133 11.89 56.51
Total $8,805,184 $21.03 100.00%
Issues:
Labor $6,727,162 $5.31 29.12%
Non-labor 2,439,752 1.92 10.56
Allocated 13,936,643 10.99 60.32
Total $23,103,558 $18.23 100.00%
Total:
Labor $10,352,555 $6.14 32.44%
Non-labor 2,643,410 1.57 8.28
Allocated 18,912,777 11.22 59.27
Total $31,908,741 $18.92 100.00%
1. DIRECT LABOR
The unit cost of direct labor between receipts
($8.66) and issues ($5.31) varies because receipts are much
more labor intensive. In receipt processing, direct labor is
expended identifying the material and ensuring the receipt
documentation matches the material. Additionally, at Oakland
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the Navy Integrated Storage and Retrieval System (NISTARS)
aids in reducing the direct labor costs of both receipts and
issues, but is much more effective in lowering issue direct
labor costs. Dividing the direct labor costs by the productive
manhours8 used to produce the output gives Oakland an
average labor wage rate of $15.54 per hour for receipts, $8.22
average per hour for issues and $9.84 average per hour for
total work units. We did not investigate the cause of the
difference in average labor wage rates between receipts and
issues because this was not within the scope of this thesis.
But it is a significant difference and should be researched in
the future.
2. NON-LABOR COSTS
The unit cost of non-labor between receipts ($.49)
and issues ($1.92) varies because the non-labor cost is
primarily made up of supplies such as packing aiid shipping
material. Issues require some degree of packaging whether the
material is going to a local customer or an overseas customer.
3. ALLOCATED COSTS
The unit cost of the allocated costs is $11.89 for
receipts and $10.99 for issues. Concerning tL_ allocated
portion (includes G&A and indirect costs) of unit costs at
Oakland, from Table 4 we ,ee that allocated costs make up
"eThe productive manhour amounts come from the G&A
Manhours-CIV column of the unit cost report Part I for Oakland
which is Figure 4-1.
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about 60% of the total unit costs whether we are talking about
receipts, issues or total units. Compared to the other sites
researched, we will see that this allocated cost is similar to
Tracy and Sharpe.
The portion of G&A costs within the total allocated costs
varies between receipts and issues. From Table 5 we can see
that for receipts, G&A costs are 59% of total allocated costs,
for issues the percentage is 74% and for total workload the
percentage is 70%. One reason the percentages differ between
receipts and issues may be due to the overstatement of
indirect/overhead costs allocated to receipts. Since the
indirect/overhead costs are greater for .eceipts, the G&A
costs make up a smaller percentage of the total allocated
costs.
TABLE 5
PERCENT OF ALLOCATED COSTS
Total Costs Unit % of
(thousands) Cost Total
Receipts:
G&A $2,945 $7.03 59%
Indirect 2,031 4.86 41
Total $4,976 $11.89 100%
Issues:
G&A $10,338 $8.16 74%
Indirect 3,598 2.83 26
Total $13,936 $10.99 100%
Totals:
G&A $13,284 $7.88 70%
Indirect 5,629 3.-34- 30
Total $18,913 $11.22 100%
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From Figure 4-1, the total number of productive manhours
used at Oakland to perform 1,686,302 units of output was
1,214,608 hours. This total was used in the allocation of G&A
costs. Also from Figure 4-1 we can see that 809,105 hours were
used in the allocation of indirect/overhead costs. Previously
we discussed that the difference between the manhours in the
G&A column and the manhours in the indirect/overhead column
was due to all indirect manhours being excluded from the
allocation of overhead or indirect costs. The difference
between these two manhour totals leads to the conclusion that
Oakland used 405,503 manhours of indirect labor in producing
1,686,302 units of output. The percentage of indirect labor to
total labor is 38.55%. Compared to the other two sites
researched we will see that this percentage is quite high.
4. TRZAT)MNT OF OTHER FUNCTIONS (NON-DISTRIBUTION)
Previously we mentioned that each of these supply
depots perform other missions or uniques which are not subject
to the unit cost computations. At Oakland these uniques fall
under two categories, those missions that are considered to be
within the realm of physical distribution and were transferred
to DDRW and those missions that were not considered to be part
of the physical distribution function and were not transferred
to DDRW. The decision as to what would transfer to DDRW was
agreed upon by DLA and NAVSUP.
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The unique functions that were transferred to DDRW
include repairables, hazardous material, radioactive material,
and special weapons material. Material in each of these
categories require greater care and are more labor intensive
than other types of material when making issues or processing
receipts. These functions were transferred to DDRW because
they are physical distribution in nature (i.e., receipt, stow
and issue).
Those unique functions of NSC Oakland which did not
transfer to DDRW include the missions of the financial
services, regional contracting, personal property and
retrograde repairable screening departments or divisions.
These functions are supervised and managed by personnel not
attached to the physical distribution department.
The total amount of allocated costs at Oakland was
$40,037,857 (includes G&A and indirect costs). Of this amount
only $18,912,777 or 47.24% was allocated to the output
measures of issues and receipts. The remaining amount was
allocated to other missions or uniques. When compared to the
other two sites this allocation percentage is extremely low.
Additionally, 42% of the G&A costs at Oakland were allocated
to the output measures while 66% of the overhead (indirect)
costs were allocated to the output measures. In addition to
the low percentage of indirect/overhead costs allocated to
output measures, it was surprising to see that $3,155,628 or
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7.88% of these costs was allocated to support of tenant
commands.
E. TRACY UNIT COST
Figure 4-3 is the Part I, Manhour and Profile and G&A
Allocation for Tracy for FY89. Figure 4-4 is the Part II,
Costs and Workload for Tracy for FY89. From Figure 4-4 we can
see that the unit cost for Tracy to process bin receipts was
$15.89 per bin receipt, to process bulk receipts was $44.84
per bulk receipt, to make bin issues was $5.35 per bin issue,
to make bulk issues was $34.59 per bulk issue and for total
output was $16.21 per unit of output.
1. BIN AND BULK SUBCLASSIFICATIONS
The terms bin and bulk are used to describe the type
of storage area required for an item. Bin items are normally
small in nature. Examples of these types of items are circuit
cards, nuts, bolts and screws. A large quantity of these type
of items can be stored in one unique storage area such as a
drawer, storage pan or similar small storage device.
Bulk items on the other hand require a larger storage
area. Examples of bulk items are plate metal, tires,
propellers or subsistence items.
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DI'V COST, MANMPEF AND WORKLOAD ANALYSIS REPORT
DLA FUN DATE- O802/19
TRACY DEPYT RUN TIME: 14:42:02
DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
PART I MANHOUR PROFILE AND G & A ALLOCATION
FISCAL YEAR 89
- - G&A MA.NHORS - - - -OVERRED APOURS- - ALOCIATED ALLOCATED ALLOCATED
NIL CIV 2 NIL CIV t G6A COSTS OE CxSTS TOT COSTS
RECEIPTS BIN 0 102.207 4 C: 0 102.207 5 2D ].07,902 541,974 1.549.877
RECE.P. S -s:..' 0 179.&V 7.06 0 179.83S 9 25 1,772,449 95.626 2,721,074
ISSu9S - FIN 0 317,775 12 47 0 317,775 16 34 3.133,694 1,695,06F 4,818,79
ISSLT.2- BlR0 31.760 1.374,294 55.18 0 803.671 41 32 13.865,619 4.26,.63 18,127.249
RCS & ISSUES 31.76^ 1.974.114 78.72 0 1.403 491 721 6 19.780.664 7.442.297 27,222,9;2
'E: OUT.T- SF'
SrT ASSE5. .  0 15.15t .59 0 15.156 78 149.4;4 80 395 229.:
CC? OFRTT2O\S 0 4.52S .18 0 4.539 .23 44.758 24.0A- 69 82.
DIZlSS 0 95.97- 3 79 0 96.575 4.97 952.362 512,109 1.464,470
T?.!-PA-V, 0 120,637 4 73 0 120.637 6 20 1.189,644 639.70: 1.829,345
CTR WOIR?,TET wRi 0 c .o, 0 0 .00 0 0 0
SAY INS HO. 0 0 .00 0 0 00 0 C 0
STOJREAW S 0 C .00 0 0 06 0 0 0
WOFJ?,' 01 0 138.84. 5 ! 0 138,844 7.34 1.369.19- 73.2-. 2.105,447
SLMOET000'EP? 0 C .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0
VAI r" 'E (DD3?/D0J) 0 c Oc 0 0 .or C 0 0
ALk:Cl-  0 47.,2 1.86 0 47.30A 2 43 46(453 250 823 717.216
RE1M',-- FFF & F 0 118,43: 4 65 0 118.433 6.09 1.167.915 628,0:7 1,795,932
iF'7:7kR;NA AS-!7l O , .oo 0 0 00 0 0 0
"I --,- S 0 . .(y 0 o ,.. T C. o
E : . , 0 0 0) 0 0 0
SHE LAST 0 C .m 0 0 .0 0 0 0
T70 TE OJTPUTS-S? 0 S41.485 21 25 0 541,49'- 27 84 5,339,781 2.671,333 8.211.115
4OTE :r. OtITUTS-O&W'
DTCT 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0
CON.'Z sCOF 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0
TO IRO TPLUS-062 0 0 .00 0 0 00 0 0 0
TOT PISTRIBUTION 31.760 2,515,597 99.98 0 1.944,976 100 00 25.120,445 10,313.61 35,434,076
*OT00 E MISSIONS'
&.A REIMBURSES 0 0 0 0 0 .00 0 0 0
DE.A 0 61 .00 0 0 .00 631 0 631
TEN"iS 0 456 .02 0 0 00 5,402 0 5,402
2r DEST RANS? 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0
PIKEON 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0
TOT OTHER MISSION 0 612 .02 0 0 .00 6,033 0 6.033
TOTIAL CTIVITY 31.7603 2.516.21: 100.00 0 1.944.976 00 25,12.,479 10,313,631 5.440,110
FIGUR 4-3
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DErOT COST MANONPT AND WORKLOAD AN LYSIS REPORT
DLA. RUN DATE. 081'^C,
TRACY DEP10T RIJN TIME 14 42 02
DISTRIBUTION FUNCNT!3
PAF- 11 CCF72 A: W2LOA,
FISCA YEA: 8-9
...-. LAk,. -..... NON-LAB0R INDIPECT ALLX ATFD TOTAL WORKALDOA
CIV DIR CI'% IND MILITARY DIRECT COSTS COSTS COSTS
RECEIPTS - BIi 1,021.759 251920 0 18.301 0 1.549.877 2.844.87 179.082
UNIT COST - RCT BIN 5.71 1.42 .00 .10 .00 8.65 15 8
RECEIPTS BULK 2,016.244 361.096 0 34.872 0 2.727.076 5.147.288 114.XS
UNIT COST - RCFT BULK 17.56 3.21 .00 .30 .00 23 75 44 84
ISSUES - BIN 3.259,485 1.00i.596 0 648.473 0 4,818.759 9,735.314 1.819.765
UNIT COST -ISS BIN 1.79 .55 .00 .36 .00 2 65 5 35
IZ BC- FLK 8,849.771 3.67.222 0 2,455.8,K- 0 18,127.24^ 31.112 1 ^  89?.42'
UNIT w,- ISS BULK 9 84 1 87 .00 2 73 .00 20.15 34'59
ROTS & ISSt"Es 15.147.2q7 3.31J,,V4 1 0 3.157.50 0 27,22f.952 48.3,585 3.013.072
UNIT COS7 -plT & ISS E 03 i F 1 9 C 6 2
*OTHER OLrTPkrS-SF'
SET iSSEl'.Y 0 192.344 0 7.22: 0 229 8:9 42^.34
CC? O!EEATIONS 57.8:4 0 0 0 0 6A.82f 125 6^
921.017 35..353 0 24.84: 0 1.56.470 2,76^ b8.
TI'P~kY-EFK 0 1, .99$ C 0 0 1,829.345 _,074.34'
CIR DIRECTE WORE 0 0 0 0 0 0 C
STAY IN ScploL 0 0 0 89.408 0 0 89.41.2
SI7OVE AIDS 0 C 0 1.59S 3Y 0 K .5%3'-1
WORKAYV., 0 1.61i.512 343..,5 0 2.105,4g 44 0- ,g 4
SUJP?OC Tc OTHEr'S 0 0 0 C
FAINThCE (DRV/0D:C) C c 0 0 0
ALANFDA C 6 -2- 0 0 0 717,26 1.401.E42
KEInlj"SE FEF & H 950,81* 4 1 .44. 420.A9. 0 1,753.932 3,613.1C
fidXMTARIAN A5510 0 C 0 0 0 0 0
DEF S C C 0 0 0 0 0
EART.QUAKE 0 0 0 0 0 0 C
SHOE LASl 0 0 0 c 0 0 0
TOT IS OUTPUT-S-SF 1.929.34^ 4.54'.023 0 2.484.5': 0 8.211.15 17,16:.27
#0, "HER OUTF UTS.O6u'
IO0DS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CO JZ COF, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOT ME OLp UTS-O&6 0 0 0 0 0 C 0
TOT DISTRIBUTION 17.076.9 7.85L.855 0 5.642.003 0 35,434.076 6E 004,8&'f
*OTHER MISSIONS'
G&A REIMBUFSES 0 0 0 807.848 0 807.8- 8
DEl, 0 919 0 1.811.441 0 631 1.812 9-1
TENA)NS 0 (,0C3 0 41 0 5.4^2 11 44t
240 DEST? RANS? 0 0 0 13.530.595 0 0 I3.S3>.595
PIKE-IN 0 0 c 0 0 0 0
TOT (rIER MISSION 0 5.922 0 16.149.925 0 6,033 16.162.88
TOTAL ACTIVITY 17,076.916 7.8:.778 0 21.791.928 0 35.440,110 82.167.762
*REIKBURS ' S- INCLUDED ABOVE*
DISTIBUTIOh-SF 0 0 0 6,754.302 0 0 6.754,302
G&A FlIrD 0 C 0 807.848 0 0 807.848
DIST? I B ION'O&F 0 0 0 0 0 0 C
OTER MISSION C. 0 (1 0 0 0
TOTAl. REIMB c c 0 7.562.150 0 0 7,562,150
FIGURE 4-4
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In talking to personnel at Tracy it became apparent that
there is not a fine line between bin and bulk items. The
extremes of each type of item are easy to classify but there
are numerous items which may be classified as bin by one
manager and bulk by another. Though all three sites researched
classify bin and bulk items, Tracy is the only site for which
DMDC has captured cost data according to bin and bulk
classification. This narrative was provided as an explanation
of the terms bin and bulk but for the remainder of this
section we will combine the totals for bin and bulk issues and
receipts and will only refer to issues cr receipts.
Table 6 provides a breakdown of the unit cost for each of
these measures of output along with the percentage of each





Total Costs Unit Cost Unit Cost
Receipts:
Labor $3,662,049 $12.46 45.83%
Non-labor 53,173 .18 .66
Allocated 4,276,953 14.55 53.51
Total $7,992,175 $27.19 100.00%
Issues:
Labor $14,797,082 $5.44 36.24%
Non-labor 3,104,329 1.14 7.60
Allocated 22,946,008 8.43 56.16
Total $40,847,420 $15.01 100.00%
Total:
Labor $18,459,131 $6.13 37.82%
Non-labor 3,157,502 1.05 6.48
Allocated 27,222,962 9.03 55.70
Total $48,839,595 $16.21 100.00%
2. DIRECT LABOR
Just as in the analysis of Oakland the unit cost of
direct labor between receipts ($12.46) and issues ($5.44)
varies because receipts are much more labor intensive. At
Tracy the Defense Logistics Agency Warehousing and Shipping
Procedures (DWASP) aids in reducing the labor costs of both
receipts and issues, but is the much more effective in
lowering issue labor costs. Dividing the direct labor costs by
the productive manhours used to produce the output gives Tracy
a labor wage rate of $10.77 per hour for receipts, $7.16 per
hour for issues and $7.67 per hour for total work units. These
labor wage rates per hour are substantially lower than the
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labor wage rates at Oakland. Nothing in our research leads us
to any conclusion regarding this difference.
3. NON-LABOR COSTS
As in the case of Oakland we can see that the non-
labor unit costs at Tracy are higher for issues ($1.14) than
for receipts ($.18) for the same reason as provided in the
Oakland discussion, issues require mure packaging/packing
materials than do receipts.
4. ALLOCATED COSTS
As seen in Table 6 the percentage of allocated costs
to total costs is approximately 56%, which is lower than
Oakland's 60%.
From Table 7 we can see that the portion of G&A costs to
total allocated costs varies between receipts and issues. For
receipts G&A costs are 65% of total costs, for issues the
percentage is 74% and for total workload the percentage is
73%. This reflects a similar percentage breakdown as found for
Oakland in Table 5.
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TABLE 7
PERCENT OF ALLOCATED COSTS
Total Costs Unit % of
(thousands) Cost Total
Receipts:
G&A $2,781 $9.46 65%
Indirect 1,496 5.09 _35
Total $4,277 $14.55 100%
Issues:
G&A $16,999 $6.25 74%
Indirect 5,947 2.18 26
Total $22,946 $8.43 100%
Totals:
G&A $19,780 $6.56 71%
Indirect 7,443 2.47 29
Total $27,223 $9.03 100%
From Figure 4-3, the total number of productive manhours
used at Tracy to perform 3,103,072 units of output was
1,974,114 of civilian hours and 31,760 military hours. This
amount was used in the allocation of G&A costs. Also from
Figure 4-3 we can see that 1,403,491 hours were used in the
allocation of indirect costs. This difference is similar to
the one that was discussed in the Oakland section.
Additionally, in the case of Tracy military productive
manhours were not included when computing the allocation of
indirect costs. The difference between these two manhour
figures leads to the conclusion that Tracy used 570,623
manhours of indirect labor in producing 3,013,072 units of
output. The percentage of indirect lah-r to total labor is
28.90%. This percentage is lower than the percentage of
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indirect labor at Oakland but higher than the percentage at
Sharpe.
5. TMETMZNT OF OTHER FUNCTIONS
The unique functions at Tracy include the receipt,
storage and issue of subsistence items, steel, lumber,
cable/wire and medical items. Unlike Oakland, all of the
unique functions at Tracy were transferred under DDRW control
and remain uniques.
The total allocated costs at Tracy was $35,440,110 of
which $27,222,962 or 76.81% was allocated to the output
measures of receipts and issues. This is significantly higher
than the 47.24% allocated at Oakland to receipts and issues.
Unlike Oakland, Tracy does not provide significant services to
other activities and therefore we see that most of the G&A and
indirect/overhead costs are allocated to the output measures.
F. SHARPE UNIT COST
Figure 4-5 is the Part I, Manhour and Profile and G&A
Allocation for Sharpe for FY89. Figures 4-6 and 4-7 are the
Part II, Costs and Workload for Sharpe for FY89. From Figure
4-6 we can see that the unit costs for Sharpe were $65.73 per
receipt, $38.67 per issue and $42.91 per unit of output. Table
8 provides a breakdown of the unit cost for each of these
measures of output along with the percentage of each part of





Total Costs Unit Cost Unit Cost
Receipts:
Labor $3,297,133 $23.79 36.19%
Non-labor 68,668 .50 .76
Overhead 5,744,509 41.44 63.05
Total $9,110,310 $65.73 100.00%
Issues:
Labor $9,209,207 $12.33 31.89%
Non-labor 3,576,126 4.79 12.39
Overhead 16,082,277 21.55 55.72
Total $28,867,610 $38.67 100.00%
Total:
Labor $12,506,340 $14.13 32.93%
Non-labor 3,644,794 4.12 9.60
Overhead 21,826,786 24.66 57.47
Total $37,977,920 $42 91 100.00%
1. DIRECT LABOR
As with Oakland and Tracy, the unit cost of labor
between receipts ($23.79) and issues ($12.33) varies because
receipts are much more labor intensive. At Sharpe, the Army
Standard Depot System (SDS) with the Area Oriented Depot (AOD)
modification aids in reducing the labor costs of both receipts
and issues, but is the much more effective in lowering issue
labor costs.
Sharpe is the only activity of the three sites researched
for which DMDC has included military labor costs when
computing unit costs. It should be noted that military labor
costs were $.04 per unit and this equates to approximately .1%
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or less of the total unit cost of receipts, issues or total
output. Therefore, military labor costs are not a significant
portion of the unit cost and not likely to be in the future.
Dividing the direct labor costs by the productive
manhours used to produce the output gives Sharpe a wage labor
rate of $15.55 per hour for receipts, $13.36 per hour for
issues and $13.88 per hour for total work units.
The direct labor cost amount at Sharpe is significantly
higher than at both Oakland and Tracy. A portion of this is
due to the fact that Sharpe's main distribution building known
as the WDF currently lacks a sophisticated computer software
system to enhance the output of the workers. Table-9 shows the
workload per hour at Oakland, Tracy and Sharpe. This
"inefficiency" coupled with the higher labor wage rate at
Sharpe results in the direct labor costs being much greater at
Sharpe than at Oakland or Tracy. These workload per hour
figures were derived by dividing the workload per output
measure reported on Part II of the unit cost reports by the
productive manhours for each output measure as reported on
Part I of the unit cost reports.
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DEPOT COST. MANPOWER AND WORKLOAD ANALYSIS REPORT
APWA RUN DATE: 10/01/90




- - - G&A MANHOURS - - - - -OVERHEAD MANHOURS- - ALLOCATED ALLOCATED ALLOCATED
NIL CIV Z mill CIV Z ISC COSTS G&A COSTS OH COSTS TOT COS
"STOCK FUND-SECONDARY ITEM W.,
'PRIMARY KEASJRE
REEIPTS 331 211.677 12 97 33! 211 677 22 27 57.925 2.989.897 845.838 3.893,659
ISSLES 2.660 686.841 42 19 1 997 594.468 62 36 188.385 P.413.264 2.379,686 10.981.335
TOT SEC RECPT & ISS 2.991 898.518 55 17 2,328 806.145 84 52 246,309 11.403,161 3,225,524 14.874,994
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COSIS INSPECTION 100 21 787 2 34 100 21.787 2 29 5.98 309.149 87.321 402.4-'
COSIS O.E5AT1C,3 0 17 451 1 01 0 17.450 1 82 4.768 247.716 69.609 322.1C3
TOTAL COSIS 100 39.237 2 41 l0 19.237 4 11 10.748 556,865 156.941 724.553
'OTHER OUFLSL7 NOT MEASURED
CCF OFE*7IONS 0 0 01 0 0 00 0 2.121,144 C 2.121.144
SET 0 370 02 0 370 04 I01 5.34j 1.476 6.95t
Ay, ".Kv 13 64.890 3 97 13 64.8W7 6 79 17.733 0 25S 940 276.673
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TOTAL SF-SEC ITEM3 3.104 1,003.015 61 57 2 44] 910.642 95 46 274.891 14,086,519 3,642.88.1 18.004.291
-"'.#A-MAJOR END ITEM GNT &I AMUNITION
'MAJ; EN" ITEMS
'PPIPA-Y MEASU;E
REZEh IS 0 0 or 0 0 .00 c 0 0 00 ,.C. C ""t
TOT NAj RE1r & ISS 0 0 .00 6 0 cu 0 0 0
'079ER OL,7P7 MEASURES
CoI S INSiEC 10N C 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
COSIS OPLiTICNS 0 0 .00 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
COSIS EXEROIS!NO 0 6,536 .40 0 6.536 .68 1,786 92.143 26.076 323 "
TOTAL M9J COSIS 0 6.536 43 0 6,535 .68 1,786 92.143 26.076 120.035
'OTHER OLTPUTS )O)T MEASURED
WF0 36.568 2 24 0 30.568 3 82 9,991 514.956 145.854 670.84!
TLCh ASS!STA)NE 0 305 .02 0 L,; .03 83 4,207 1.217 5507
TOT OTS O0C-3T ME'S 0 36,873 2 2E 0 36 873 3,86 10.0?4 519.163 147.110 676.348
TOT MAJ0O END ITES 0 43.409 2 66 0 43.409 4.54 11,860 611.305 173.187 790,353
TOTAL SEZ&MAJ ITE4S 3.104 1,04t.424 64 23 2 44f 94,.051 100 00 286.751 14.697.825 3.816.068 18.&'.644
"*ACJNIT ICY
'PRIMARY MEZASUFE
PECEIPTS 0 0 O 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
ISSUES 0 0 .CV 0 0 00 0 0 0 C
TCr, AM REZPT&l I5S 0 0 .Oc 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
'OTBER OrTPU' KEASURESCOSIS INSPECi0N 0 C k, 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
COS!S OERATIOO 0 0 Ou 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
TOTAL AN7 COS1S 0 0 O 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
'OTBER OUTPUTS NOT EASuPEDSET ASSEM!A 0 0 00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
TECH ASSISTAW.E 0 0 .00 0 0 o0 0 0 0 0
CRMICAL 0 0 00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
SPECIAL WEAPON, 0 0 .(0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
RAD/CEM ,STIE DIS. 0 C. 00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
TOT OTH OT-NCT MEAS 0 0 .00 4) 0 .00 0 0 0 0
TOTAL A4UNITION 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
TOT ORA-KAJ & AW,. 0 43.409 2 66 0 41.40 .00 11.860 611.306 173.187 796,353
'"1OT IIER 1(1551.;
BOUSEH02D C OXS 186 8.793 .55 0 0 .00 2,453 126.852 0 129,305
DEPOT MAINFENX.IE 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
MAOF TENAN SUPPORT 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 0 0 0 0
NISC OTNER 32.107 543.515 35 23 0 0 00 157.271 383,575 0 540.846
TOT 0TH MISSION 32.293 552.308 35 77 0 0 00 159.724 510.427 0 67C.151
"TOT ACTIVITY" 35.397 1.598.732 IOC 00 2 441 954 051 00 446.475 15,208.252 3.816.068 19.470.795
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DISTRIBUJTION FUKTIOJS
PART II COSTS AND WORKLOAD
FISCAL YEAR 89
...-. LABOR ..... NON-LABOR INDIRECT ALLOCATED TOTAL WORKLOAD
CIV DIR CIV IND MILITARY DIRECT COSTS COSTS COSTS
"STOCr FUND-SECONDARY ITEM MGMT
'PRIOW.kY MEASURE
ECEITS 3.291.788 0 5.345 68 668 1.850.850 3.893.659 9,110.310 138.597
UN:T COST-RECPTS 23.75 .00 .04 50 13.35 28.09 65.73
ISSUES 9.176.829 0 32.378 3 576 125 5.100.942 10.981,335 28.867.610 746.499
UNIT COST-ISSUETSS 12.29 03 .04 4 79 6.83 14 71 38.67
TOT SEC RECFT 6 IS5 12.468,617 0 37,723 3 644 794 6.951.792 14.874.994 37.977.923 885.096
UN!T COST-SF 1'.09 00 O 4 12 7 85 16 81 42 91
1OTDER OUTF1r MEASURES
COSIS INSFECTION 397.189 0 I 622 78. 329.358 402.450 1,131.399 13.9C5
UNIT COST-CO'SS INSP 28 56 .00 I? 06 23 69 28 94 81.37
COSIS OPERATIONS 302.130 0 0 75 351 199.890 322.103 899,474 3.588
UNIT COST-C3SIS OPS 84 21 .030 0 21 D 55 71 89 77 250 69
TOTAL COSIS 699.319 0 1 t22 76 131 529.248 724.553 2.030,873 17.493
UNIT CCH-COSIS 39 98 00 ( 4 35 30 25 41 42 116 10
IUThEa IbT.r iJJ kEW L
CCF OE.0kIO C 0 0 0 3,t,1.381 .237.127 2.121.144 6,973.6,2
SET ASSLM..6 5.430 0 0 0 2,927 6.926 15.283
A0/ KYo 1.269,0'8 C 208 I 091 891 0 276.673 2,637.850.
TOT OTH Ot'T-NOT MEAS 1.274.508 0 ?OA 4.707.272 1.240.054 2,404.743 9.626,7 85
TOTA', SF-SEC ITEMS 14.442.444 0 39 '53 8 478.197 8.721.094 18.004.291 49.635.579
'"*OCA-MAJOR END IEM MGT 6 AMKbNITION
"MAJ.'P END ITEXS
'PRIIAUY MEASURE
RECE!FTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIT COST-RECPTS .00 03 .00 03 .00 .0( .00
ISSUES 0 0 0 773.266 0 0 773.266
UNIT COST-ISSUES 00 00 w 00 03 .00 O0
TOT MWJ REC'T 6ISc 0 0 0 773.266 0 0 773,266
UNIT COST-MAJ ITEMS 03 .00 O0 0 .00 .00 .00
10THER O'TVUr MEASLrRE,
COSIS INSPECTIO4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIT C0cl-COSIS INS? .00 OS 00 00 00 .00 O0
CosIS OPERATIONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIT COST-COSIS OPS .00 .00 3 OS 0S .00 .00
COSIS EXERCISING. 112.297 0 0 1M.436 55,209 120,005 447.947
UNIT COST-COSIS EXER .00 O0 (. O0 03 .0 .00
TOTAL MAJ COSIS 112,297 0 0 IO 436 55.20 120.005 447.947
UNIT COST-COSIS MAJ .00 00 IV) (10 00 .00 .00
'OTHER OUTPLGS NOT MEASULrJ
UMFP 623.200 0 0 4?1.356 269.806 670.841 1.988.203TECH ASSISTArCE 5.03 0 0 1.278 2.878 5.507 14.726TOT OTh OUT-IA3T MEAS 628.263 0 0 175.634 272,684 676.348 2.002.29
TOT MAJOR END ITEMS 740,560 0 () 1.159 336 327.893 796.353 3.224,142
TOTAL SEC&MAJ ITEMS 15,93.004 0 39 5') 9.17 533 9.048.987 18.800.644 52,859.721
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UISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
PAPT I1 COSTS AN: WORYLOAD
FISCAL, YEA 89
.. LA ...... " LABOV INDIRECT ALLOTED T0'K WOFlAD
CIV DIp CIV IN, M!IITAFY hiPFT COSTS COSTS COTS
"AUN! ION
'PRIMAPY MIASL.'E
RECE I ITS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIT COS'-ISSUTES 00 .00 00 00 .00 00 .0c
ISSUES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNIT COST-k-4D 00 .00 00 00 .00 00 .00
TOT AVO RET 6 ISS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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TOTAL AMIK COSIS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 (> 00 00 .00 ,w0 00
SET ASSE'WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TECH ASSISTAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHEMICAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SPECIAL WEAPONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RAD/CHEK WASTE DISP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOT OTH OhIJ-NOT MEAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL AOUNTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOT OMA-MAJ 6 Aft*3. 740.560 0 0 1.359.336 327.893 796,353 3.224,42
"'OTRE MISSIONS
BOUSEHOLD GOODS 118,457 0 3.063 73 79.043 129.305 329,941
DEPOT NAINTEhARE 0 0 0 0 0 C 0
MAOF TENANT SUPPORT 0 0 0 532 089 0 0 512.089
NISC OTIER 9.370.268 0 687.257 34.546 905 2.145 540.846 25.147.421
TOT O73 MISSION 9,488.725 0 69) 370 15.051.067 81.)88 670.151 25.989.451
"TOT ACTIVITY' 24.671.729 0 729.873 74.846.600 9.130.175 19.470,795 78.849.]72






WORKLOAD PER HOUR COMPARISON
Activity Receipts/Hr Issues/Hr Workload/Hr
Oakland 1.80 1.55 1.60
Tracy 1.04 1.61 1.53
Sharpe .65 1.08 .98
2. NON-LABOR COSTS
As at Oakland and Tracy, the unit cost for non-labor
costs varies between receipts ($.50) and issues ($4.79)
because issues require more packaging/packing supplies. It
should be noted that Sharpe's non-labor costs are triple those
at Oakland and Tracy for issues.
3. ALLOCATED COSTS
The allocated portion of unit costs at Sharpe makes
up approximately 57% of the total unit cost. This percentage
is slightly less than the 60% witnessed at Oakland and similar
to the percentage found at Tracy.
As mentioned in Chapter III, Sharpe was previously funded
under the Industrial Fund concept. Their allocated costs were
forced into the unit cost report generated by DMDC because
DMDC was unable to break out the G&A and indirect/overhead
costs from the financial records provided by the Army.
Indirect costs and G&A costs were not allocated by DMDC, but
rather were input directly into the report from information
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provided by DESCOM. For example, the G&A manhours for receipts
were 12.97% of the total manhours yet receipts were assigned
20% of the G&A costs.
Also, some indirect costs are not included on Part I of
the Sharpe unit cost report and there is an additional column
on Sharpe's Part II (Figure 4-6) labeled "Indirect Costs". We
could not determine which indirect or overhead cost codes were
included in Part I and which cost code dollar amounts were
reported directly on Part II.
Additionally, on Figure 4-5 note the column titled
"Allocated ISC Costs." These costs are costs allocated to
Sharpe from the Army's Information System Command. This is the
only case for the three supply depots researched for which a
headquarters command allocated some type of headquarters'
overhead costs to the depot. These "ISC" costs were allocated
to receipts, etc. by the percentage of G&A manhours to total
manhours.
From Figure 4-5, the total number of productive manhours
used at Sharpe to perform 885,096 of output consisted of
1,003,015 civilian hours and 3,104 military hours. Also from
Figure 4-5 we can see that 910,642 civilian hours and 2,441
military hours would have been used to allocate overhead or
indirect costs if DMDC had been able to allocate these costs.
Previously we discussed that this difference was due to all
indirect manhours being excluded from the allocation of
overhead or indirect costs. The difference between these two
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manhour figures leads to the conclusion that Sharpe used
93,036 manhours of indirect labor in producing 885,096 units
of output. The percentage of indirect labor to total labor is
9.25%. This percentage is significantly lower than the
percentage of indirect labor at Oakland (38.55%) and Tracy
(28.9%).
4. TRZATMEZNT OF OTHER FUNCTIONS
The unique functions at Sharpe include the receipt,
storage and issue of tires, managing a household goods
department, and care of supplies in storage (COSIS). Care of
supplies in storage is the maintenance of items such as
engines and pumps. Lubrication and testing of these stored
items is required to ensure that they will function properly
when requisitioned by the end user. On Figure 4-6 the reader
can see that a unit cost has been generated for COSIS
operations. In discussions with DMDC and DOD personnel this
unit cost will not be used in resourcing COSIS operations at
Sharpe. As in the case of Tracy, all of the unique functions
at Sharpe remain under DDRW control.
The total allocated costs at Sharpe were $28,600,970 of
which $21,826,786 or 76.31% was allocated to the output
measures of receipts and issues. This is significantly higher
than the 47.24% allocated at Oakland to receipts and issues
and approximately the same as the 76.81% allocated at Tracy.
Sharpe is similar to Oakland in that it performs services for
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other activities or missions. We expected to find t'
percentage of G&A and indirect costs allocated to the output
measures (receipts and issues) closely resemble that found at
Oakland. However, as shown above this percentage more closely
mirrors Tracy rather than Oakland. It appears as if the
"inefficiency" at Sharpe causes more manhours to be assigned
to the output measures. Since manhours are used to allocate
G&A and indirect/overhead costs, the output measures may bear
a higher share of these costs than you would otherwise expect.
Thus, costs allocated to other missions may be understated.
G. UNIQUES-OTHER FUNCTIONS
In Chapter III we discussed that once implemented, unit
cost data will be used by DOD managers to reduce the cost of
doing business, improve operations, measure improvements,
evaluate and support budgets, and make decisions. We have
discussed that managers at DDRW are faced with missions which
are subject to unit costing and those which are not subject to
unit costing. Table 10 shows what percentage of the three
sites total costs are unit costs and the percentage of total
costs which are not.
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Table 10
Unit and Unique Costs
Total Costs Unit Costs (%) Unique Costs (%)
Oakland $72.OM $31.9M (44) $40.1M (56)
Tracy $82.1M $48.8M (59) $33.3M (41)
Sharpe $78.8M $37.9M (48) $40.9M (52)
Managers at all levels need to be aware of what portion
of the total costs of an activity falls under unit costing.
The dollar amount and percentage of unique costs shown in
Table 10 is quite significant. Managers will have to use means
other than unit costing or variations of unit costing to
identify potential savings in the unique cost areas.
During personal intptrviews at each of the three sites it
was noted that some managers have the ability to charge labor
costs to either unit cost areas or other areas. We did not
investigate this area, but the fact that unit cost data can be
manipulated at the source document level 9 may cause someone
to question the accuracy of either the unit cost totals or the
unique cost totals. Therefore, not only direct labor will be
misstated but costs allocated on the basis of direct labor
data will also be misstated.
In the future uniques should become reimbursables with a
"customer" paying for the services/products they receive. A
"Recall that labor costs and appropriate cost codes are
documented on time cards.
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customer of uniques can reasonably be expected to ask "What am
I paying for?" Unit costing will enable the provider of the
uniques to show the customer what they are paying for since
uniques will bear their share of the G&A and indirect costs of
the activity. The customer can then negotiate from an informed
position and the contracts will be based on more realistic
rates.
H. COMPARISONS AND RECOOMMNDATIONS
The previous three sections provided information on how
the G&A and indirect costs were allocated at each of the three
sites and examined the makeup of the unit cost at each site.
There are differences as to how these costs were allocated. At
Oakland and Tracy these costs were allocated based on
productive manhours. At Sharpe these costs were allocated by
DESCOM by some other means based on the Army's Industrial Fund
accounting system. We were unable to find out how these costs
were allocated. We observed the unit costs at Sharpe to be
extraordinarily high compared to Oakland and Tracy. Our
research also found that the average wage rate per hour for
receipts is greater than for issues and that Sharpe's average
wage rate per hour is greater than the rates observed at
Oakland and Tracy. Additionally, we discovered that the
receipts and issues per productive manhour are significantly
greater at Oakland ani Tracy in comparison to Sharpe.
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Beginning with fiscal year 1991 each of the three
researched sites will be using the DLA accounting system. Each
will be using the same cost codes to account for the same
functions. The exception to this rule will be that each
activity will still be performing unique functions, but the
primary output measures will be accounted for in the same way.
Additionally, G&A and indirect costs will use the same cost
codes at each site.
For fiscal year 1989, since the overhead (indirect) costs
are understated for issues and overstated for receipts we feel
that it is best to focus on the total unit cost at a supply
depot. Total unit cost is the aggregate of the receipt and
issue costs and workload. As mentioned earlier in this chapter
beginning with fiscal year 1991, this under and overstatement
of overhead (indirect) costs will not occur.
Productive manhours are the key to how G&A ank! overhead
costs are allocated. We did not research this area, but there
may be a better way to allocate some of these costs. Utility
and janitorial costs could be allocated on the basis of square
feet. The cost to allocate different G&A and overhead based on
different denominators may exceed the benefit provided the
manager. Allocating G&A and overhead costs based on productive
manhours is easily done by DMDC. Attempting to provide a more
"correct" allocation may not be cost effective.
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I. FINAL COMMENTS
Though our research effort primarily dealt with analyzing
the allocation of G&A and indirect costs, we would be remiss
if we did not provide comments on the entire DOD unit cost
system. The concept behind the unit cost system is to motivate
managers and workers to become aware of costs and to highlight
the cost factor in management decisions.
Under bottom line budgeting getting the job done was the
primary effort with the question "What does/did it cost?"
seldom being answered if in fact the question was even asked.
From our perspective, unit costing has changed that attitude.
In every interview with managers at the three sites, the
concern for "low unit costs" was voiced repeatedly and the
managers were talking about FY89 dollars which had already
been spent!
Our research did not include discussions with lower level
depot personnel making the receipts and issues. However, we
are confident that this concern for lower unit costs has
trickled down to the shop floor from the managers' offices.
Evidence of this employee awareness of costs is provided by
those activities which have implemented some form of employee
gainsharing such as the Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg, PA and
the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC.
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Lowering unit costs at the expense of "quality" should
not be accepted by managers. Standards for service20 should
not be randomly decreased to allow lower unit costs. Unit
costing should not impair the non-financial measures of
performance for quality, service and timeliness. If standards
need to be lowered it should be done selectively with impact
to the customer as the primary concern and not lower costs.
Everyday we see American companies say that they can and do
produce a high quality product at a low price and we feel that
this can also be accomplished at supply depots and other
activities which will be resourced by the unit cost method.
Unit costing should induce managers to become resourceful and
to identify inefficiencies in the work process. Reducing
inefficiencies will free up resources to be used to improve
quality.
In this era of declining resources unit costing has given
managers another management tool besides the "meat axe"
approach to reducing costs. By analyzing the total unit cost
and its components21 managers should be able to make more
intelligent decisions when faced with reduced resources and
selectively decide where to place these resources.
2°Such as receipts and issues processed on time, warehouse
refusals and inventory accuracy.
21Direct and indirect labor, direct and indirect material,
G&A and other indirect or overhead costs.
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We are amazed at the speed with which unit costing has
been both developed and implemented within DOD. In less than
a year unit costs went from being a concept to being
implemented at supply depots with other functions soon to
follow. For an organization which has received criticism for
being bureaucratic and reluctant to change, especially in the
acquisition area, DOD's rapid implementation is noteworthy.
Additionally, the true beauty of the unit cost system is that
the implementation of unit costing appears to be relatively
inexpensive. The development of this system did not involve
millions of dollars of consultants fees for study and design
of the system.
The primary management tool, the unit cost report, is
created by DMDC from data which already exists. With the
exception of the manhours spent by DMDC writing programs to
convert the raw financial data into the reports and the
conferences which have been held to discuss and decide the
output measures and uniques of each of the functions to be
unit costed the cost has been minimal. We have been told that
DMDC expects to add approximately 20 people to maintain and
run the unit cost system. We feel that the benefits to DOD
managers derived from this management tool will far exceed
both the costs incurred to date and future operation and
maintenance of the unit costs system.
Throughout this thesis we have repeatedly stated that
unit costing in itself will not reduce costs or result in
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savings. An example of this comes from our analysis of the
unit cost at Sharpe. At Sharpe we saw that the workload per
hour was significantly inefficient when compared to Oakland
and Tracy. Now that the unit cost reports have brought this
fact to the attention of the DDRW and Sharpe site managers
actions should be taken to improve the efficiency of the
Sharpe site. The first action is already in progress and that
is to acquire a software program to run the WDF. We are
confident that managers will find other actions to take to
improve the efficiency of Sharpe which will result in reduced
costs and increased savings. Therefore, it is the response
that managers take to the information provided by the unit
cost system that will result in savings.
By no means do we profess that the unit cost system is
the panacea to reducing all expenditures at supply depots and
the other functions to be unit costed. But it is a giant step
in the right direction. Unit costing will provide managers a
standardized metric in their analysis of the "cost of doing
business." Managers are still free to implement planning and
control systems for their local activities and operations that
help them meet the desired goals and objectives.
In Chapter V we will provide a summary of this research
project as well as identifying possible future research areas
related to this thesis.
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V. SUMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I provided a brief discussion of the major issue
of why DOD must reduce expenditures and several alternative
methods of reducing expenditures. The concept of resourcing or
budgeting by unit costs was introduced by DOD as a means to
motivate managers to analyze the processes of their activity
and to eliminate inefficiencies. Specifically, we focused our
research attention on the area of unit cost's allocation of
G&A and overhead costs at three physical distribution
activities.
In Chapter II we presented the background and historical
information on both unit costs and the three research sites.
We briefly mentioned the Defense Management Review and its
impact on unit costs and the consolidation of physical
distribution activities.
A presentation of the methods by which we collected
,iaterial for this research paper was provided in Chapter III.
Since the concept of unit --osts is relatively new to DOD we
were limited to doing field researc o collect data and
information. Personal interviews and re; .w of DOD guidelines
were our primary sources of gathering material. Additionally,
we provided the definitions which will be used in the DOD unit
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cost system. This chapter included sections on the primary
outputs (line items issued and line items received) as well as
the costs (direct, indirect, G&A) to be used in this system.
The role of the Defense Manpower Data Center in the unit cost
system was also covered.
In our analysis chapter, Chapter IV, we discussed how
overhead costs were allocated at each of the three researched
sites. We saw that the allocation of overhead is based on
productive manhours but that each site has had a different
interpretation of productive manhour. Military manhours were
not included in any allocation computation at Oakland. At
Tracy military manhours were included in productive manhours
when allocating G&A costs but not while allocating indirect
costs. While at Sharpe (SHAD) we saw that the allocation of
G&A and overhead costs were performed by DESCOM by some other
manner and provided to DMDC for input.
It was also shown that the percentage of indirect labor
costs varies significantly at each of the sites. Additionally,
the percentage of overhead allocated to the output measures
varies at each of the sites.
The high cost of direct labor, high unit costs and the
"inefficiency" at Sharpe when compared to Oakland and Tracy
was also discussed.
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS
The concept of unit costs in DOD is an evolving area and
this project provided us with an opportunity to witness rapid
changes in guidelines and policies. It also gave us a chance
to see other possible questions which could be researched.
These questions include:
1.) Trend Analysis. Fiscal year 1989 is the first year
for which unit cost data was captured by DMDC. By the mid-90's
sufficient data should be available for a researcher to
perform a trend analysis to see how, where and if costs have
decreased. As discussed in Chapter II, the unit cost concept
is currently being extended to cover eight functional areas
such as health care, recruiting, military training and
commissaries. Research and trend analysis does not need to be
limited to unit costs at supply depots.
2.) Implementation Study. A researcher could study how
unit cost concepts were implemented at an activity. One could
investigate if the implementation of unit costs changed the
organization of that activity and if it did, how did it
change. A study comparing the implementation at several
similar activities could be performed.
3.) Consolidation Study. As discussed in Chapter II,
future plans for DDRW call for optimal use of the WDF at
Sharpe and Tracy to be used as the primary hub for receiving,
issuing and storing of material. A study of the impact of
these plans on the utilization of the facilities at NSC
77
Oakland could be investigated. Additionally, research could be
performed to see if customer support for the current customers
of any of the sites consolidated changed. Specifically, one
could investigate the -hange in support of the afloat and
ashore customers of NSC Oakland after the physical
distribution function at NSC Oakland shifted to DDRW.
4.) ADP Consolidation. The consolidation of the three
sites under DDRW has mandated that either each of the computer
systems at the sites be able to talk to each other or that a
new ADP system be installed at each of the sites. The effects
on an organization of implementing a change to ADP software
and hardware is an area rich in research possibilities.
5.) Unit Cost and Employee Gain Sharing. A study could be
performed to see how the implementation of unit costs and
employee gain sharing programs are faring. Employee Gain
Sharing programs have already been initiated at several DOD
supply depots prior to unit cost resourcing. The effects of
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* Operations Overhead *
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72 Real Property Maintenance
73 Real Property Maintenance
74 Real Property Maintenance
75 Real Property Maintenance
76 Real Property Maintenance
77 Real Property Maintenance
78 Real Property Maintenance

















Army Supply Depot AMS Cost Codes
*Receipts*
7A20A Receipt Other Supply
7A20B Packing For Storage
















* Other outputs-Stock Fund*
7D20A Set Assembly
7D20B Set Assembly Inspection
7M20A CCP Cont, Mfr
7M20B CCP Trans Inspection
7M20C CC? Trans 0/S DSS









" Armiy Depot Functiong-O&M*
7P20A UMFP-.Unit Matl Storage & Inspection
7P20B UMFPh'-Unit Mati Packing









7C20B Spec Proc Non-ASF
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